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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
LEGISLATION
THE UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT IN MISSOURI
INTRODUCTION
When Missouri enacted its GENERAL AND BUSINESS CORPORA-
TION ACT in 1943 it also adopted the UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER
ACT.' Although the legislature enacted most of the Uniform Act
substantially as promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 2 its version of section 13, which relates to attach-
ment and levy upon shares of stock, differs considerably from
that set forth in the Model Act, which provides:
No attachment or levy upon shares of stock for which a
certificate is outstanding shall be valid until such certificate
be actually seized by the officer making the attachment or
levy, or be surrendered to the corporation which issued it, or
its transfer by the holder be enjoined. Except where a
certificate is lost or destroyed such corporation shall not be
compelled to issue a new certificate for the stock until the
old certificate is surrendered to it. 3
Section 13 invokes a thorough-going change in the rules
pertaining to attachment and levy of shares of stock.4 Prior
to the Uniform Act practically all jurisdictions provided that
attachment might be effected by serving notice upon the ap-
propriate corporate officer in the corporation's domicile,, most
of them in addition holding that this was the only manner in
which the attachment might be made.6 Although the Model Act
expressly puts an end to the old rule, the Missouri legislature
chose to retain the rule that attachment might be made by
notice to the corporation, making the seizure of the certificate
an additional preferred, but not essential, method. Missouri's
equivalent of the Uniform Act's section 13 is as follows:
In addition to the remedies provided by Sections 513.115
and 513.120 and related sections of the Revised Statutes
1. Mo. Rzv. STAT. §§ 403.010-403.240 (1949).
2. 6 UNIFORm LAWS ANNOTATED (1922).
3. Id. at 17.
4. In this note attachment and levy will be considered as one inasmuch
as the rules governing either are the same under both the Model Act and
the Missouri Act.
5. 11 FLETCHER, CYcLOrEDIA CoRPoRATIONs 94 (1931).
6. Contra: Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N.Y. 193, 58
N.E. 896 (1900).
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of Missouri (1949) providing for attachment or execution
upon shares of stock, attachment or execution against shares
of stock for which a certificate is outstanding shall be valid
when such certificate is actually seized by the officer levying
the attachment or execution against other personal prop-
erty: Provided, that a levy of attachment or execution re-
sulting in actual seizure of such certificate shall take pre-
cedence over all other remedies provided by law when made
at substantially the same time as such other levy, and
prompt notice thereof given to the corporation issuing such
shares. In case of levy under said sections 513.115 and
513.120 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri 1949, the inno-
cent holder for value and without notice of any certificate of
shares of stock subject to such levy may, in addition to the
assertion of claim as now provided for under Section 513.130
of said statutes, notify the corporation issuing such shares
that he has acquired rights to the certificate therefor, and
in the event that such notice shall be given prior to actual
sale of said shares under execution, it shall be the duty of
the corporation to forthwith notify the officer making the
levy or attachment, of the assertion of such adverse claim
and such notice shall act as a stay of further proceedings
in connection with such attachment or levy, and it shall
be the duty of the party asserting such claim to promptly
obtain an adjudication of the rights of the parties. Until
such rights are adjudicated the corporation shall not be
compelled to issue a new certificate for such shares of stock
until the old certificate is surrendered to it. [Sic] 7
Sections 513.115 and 513.120 expressly continued in force by the
above section are typical of the provisions to be found in most
jurisdictions prior to the Uniform Act. They provide for levy
and attachment by notice to the corporation by the levying
officer.'
7. Mo. REv. STAT. § 403.170 (1949). The conjunctive "and" or "or"
appears to be missing from the last sentence of this section.
8. "When an execution shall be issued against any person, being the
owner of any shares or stock in any bank, insurance company or other
corporation, it shall be the duty of the cashier, secretary, or chief clerk of
such bank, insurance company or other corporation upon the request of
the officer making such execution, to furnish him with a certificate
under his hand, stating the number of rights or shares the defendant
holds in the stock of such bank, company or corporation, with the encum-
brances thereon." Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.115 (1949). "The officer upon
obtaining such information or in any other manner may make a levy of
such execution on such rights or shares by leaving a true copy of such
writ with the cashier, secretary or chief clerk, and if there be no
such officer, then with some officer of such bank, association, joint
stock company or corporation, with an attested certificate by the officer
making the levy that he levies upon and takes such rights and shares
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/5
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THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF MISSOURI'S SECTION 13
1. The case of the purchaser before levy who gives notice to
the corporation before execution sale is held.
As is pointed out in the Commissioner's Note to section 13 in
6 UNIFoRm LAWS ANNOTATED, 9 prior to the adoption of the
UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT the innocent purchaser for value
frequently was not protected against a levy made by notice to
the corporation, even though the transfer of the certificate had
been made to the purchaser before levy was made at the corpora-
tion. This hardship arose from the fact that the purchaser was
not deemed to acquire title to the share until the transfer had
been made on the books of the corporation. Although no case
has passed upon the point as yet, this harsh rule appears to have
been changed in Missouri so long as the purchaser communicates
the notice of his purchase to the corporation before the execu-
tion sale is held. Sections 1 and 5 of the Uniform Act as adopted
in Missouri- operate to pass title to the innocent purchaser for
value even though the transferor had no right of possession
nor right to transfer the certificate. In addition, the effect of
these sections is to effect a transfer of title as soon as the
properly indorsed certificate is delivered to the transferee, with-
out the necessity of transfer on the books of the corporation.11
Missouri's version of section 13, as set forth above, states that
when the innocent holder for value gives notice to the corpora-
tion that he has acquired rights to the certificate this operates
to satify such execution." Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.120 (1949). "Shares of
stock in any bank, association, joint stock company or corporation, belong-
ing to any defendant in any writ of attachment, may be attached in the
same manner as the same may be levied upon under execution." Mo. REV.
STAT. § 521.250 (1949). These provisions apply only to the stock of
domestic corporations. Richardson v. Busch, 198 Mo. 174, 95 S.W. 894(1906); Armour Bros. Banking Co. v. St. Louis Nat. Bank, 113 Mo. 12,
20 S.W. 690 (1892). Although the Missouri Supreme Court has not passed
upon this point, the term "domestic corporation" has been held to compre-
hend those corporations which, although incorporated elsewhere, conduct
their "internal business" in Missouri. Dean Rapid Tel. Co. v. Howell, 162
Mo. App. 100, 144 S.W. 135 (1912); Smith v. Pilot Min. Co., 47 Mo. App.
409 (1891). § 513.130 referred to in § 403.170 is a provision, applicable
to seizures of personal property generally, that anyone other than the
judgment debtor who claims ownership of the property levied upon may
do so by affidavit in which case the levying officer may require the creditor
to post a bond to indemnify the officer against a possible liability for
conversion.
9. p. 18 (1922).
10. Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 403.050, 403.090 (1949).
11. See Commissioners' Note, 6 UNrFoRM LAWS ANNOTATD 2 (1922).
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as a stay of proceedings and prevents an execution sale. Thus
although this section does not expressly so provide the inference
certainly is that if the transferee before levy gives notice of his
acquisition before the execution sale is held, the transferee before
levy will prevail over the attaching or levying creditor. This
result seems the only one possible because, although sections
1 and 5 do not specifically say that a transferee before levy takes
free of the levy which precedes transfer upon the books of the
corporation, since sections 1 and 5 generally do pass title im-
mediately, it would appear that at the time the levy is made the
debtor-transferor no longer has any attachable interest in the
shares; i.e. the transferee has already become the owner of all
his interest. Thus a purchaser in this situation clearly seems
to be one who could not only assert his rights under the provi-
sion of section 13, but could assert them successfully.
2. The case of the purchaser before levy who fails to notify
the corporation before the execution sale is held.
In the case of the buyer who acquires the certificate before
levy is made by the old method of notice to the corporation, but
who fails to notify the corporation of his acquisition before the
execution sale is held, the purchaser at the execution sale ap-
pears to take in preference to the non-notifying transferee.
Again the result in such a situation is not expressly indicated
in the Act, and at first blush it might appear anomalous that
a transferee who had apparently acquired a good title to the
share by indorsement and delivery of the then unencumbered
certifiate should subsequently be divested of it, but the last
sentence of Missouri's section 13 seems to indicate that result.
It says: "Until such rights are adjudicated the corporation
shall not be compelled to issue a new certificate for such shares
of stock until the old certificate is surrendered to it." This rather
ambiguous sentence is obviously inserted for the protection of
the corporation. Apparently, it means that if rights are asserted
by a transferee prior to the execution sale it shall not be com-
pelled to issue a new certificate to the purchaser thereat unless
the rights of the transferee first be judicially pronounced non-
existent or the old certificate be surrendered to it. The purpose
of this requirement is to prevent double liability of the corpora-
tion-to the transferee and to the buyer on execution. However,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/5
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by implication if no rights are asserted prior to the execution
sale it shall be compellable to issue a new certificate to the
buyer on execution even though the old certificate remains
outstanding. If the corporation is compellable in such a case
it must.be because the possibility of double liability could not
exist, that once the execution sale has occurred a transferee of
the old certificate who has given no notice loses his rights. The
above seems the inescapable result in this situation under Mis-
souri's statute. The last sentence could not be taken to mean
that the corporation shall not be compelled to issue a new certif-
icate unless prior to the execution sale either rights of a
transferee are asserted and adjudicated or if no rights whatso-
ever are asserted the old certificate is surrendered to it because
this construction would conflict with the prior portion of the
section making it clear that the seizure of the old certificate is
not necessary for an effective levy, which can only be of value
to the creditor if an execution sale is held.
Assuming the former construction of Missouri's section 13 is
the correct one in the above factual situation, no hardship will
be worked upon the purchaser before levy in the bulk of cases.
There will always be a considerable time interval between th6
levy and subsequent execution sale, and in the case of an attach-
ment the interval will be even longer. Within this period the
average investor will have made his application for transfer
upon the books of the corporation. However, in the more infre-
quent case where the investor neglects to promptly apply for a
transfer, the legislature inflicts a harsh penalty for his delay. It
seems unjust to say that the delay of a few weeks in applying
for a transfer amounts to "laches" on the part of the transferee.
Moreover, the Missouri Act inflicts a hardship upon the short
term investor who expects to hold the stock for only a short
period during which no dividends will be forthcoming, for
in order to protect himself he is required to make a formal
application for transfer just as the long term investor is re-
quired to do.
3. The innocent holder for value who acquires after levy, but
notifies the corporation before an execution sale is held.
The transferee who acquires the certificate after levy has been
made by means of notice to the corporation, but who fulfills the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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requirements of an innocent holder for value and notifies the
corporation of his acquisition before an execution sale is had,
appears to take precedence over the attaching creditor. Again
this result is not expressly spelled out in the statute nor has
the Missouri court so held as yet, but this seems to be the
reasonable implication of section 13. In speaking of who may
assert rights prior to the execution sale, the statute speaks
of "the innocent holder for value and without notice." Such
language would be unnecessary if section 13 provided solely
for assertion of rights by a transferee prior to levy, for any
transferee before levy would perforce be without notice of the
levy which has not yet occurred. Thus the statute seems to
mean that any bona fide purchaser who happens to enter his
claim before the execution sale is held is protected against
the levy. Although the above appears the most probable result
under section 13 that result is not absolutely certain, however.
The Missouri court might possibly find that the legislature in
speaking of the innocent holder for value meant only the inno-
cent holder for value before levy as distinguished from a donee
or purchaser before levy who did not act bona fide, i.e. one who
shared with the debtor the anticipation of an impending levy
and acted in concert with the debtor to frustrate the expected
action of the creditor. To bolster this interpretation the court
might point out that at the time of the levy the debtor who
subsequently transfers to a bona fide purchaser did have an
attachable interest which before the adoption of the Uniform
Act was conclusively acquired by the creditor simply by notice
to the corporation. The above interpretation of "innocent holder
for value" is rather weak, however. Such an interpretation
would necessarily prejudice the rights of a bona fide donee before
levy, and there seems to be no reason why the legislature should
desire such a result. Moreover, since the transferee for value
or otherwise before levy could at most have a suspicion that
levy was imminent (i.e. he could not have knowledge of an
event that had not yet happened), he would still be an innocent
holder for value within the meaning of that term in negotiable
instrument cases, and hence the only person barred from as-
serting his rights if he acquired before levy would be the donee,
and if he is bona fide, as pointed out, there appears no reason
why the legislature would want to prejudice him. Hence, it
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/5
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seems probable that the court would prefer the innocent pur-
chaser despite his acquisition after levy so long as he notifies
the corporation before the execution sale takes place.
4. The purchaser after levy who fails to notify the corporation
before the execution sale.
It is in the situation where the bona fide purchaser acquires
the certificate after levy has been made and fails to notify the
corporation of his acquisition before the execution sale is held
that Missouri's version of the UNIFoRI STOCK TRANSFE ACT
most definitely differs from the Model Act. More properly it
should be said that the Model Act is designed to prevent such
a situation. The Commissioners' version of section 13 quite
effectively insures that no attachment or levy will take place
until the certificate has been taken out of circulation. Seizure
of the certificate 12 or its surrender to the corporation of course
achieves that result, and the third alternative method, the
enjoining of the transfer of the certificate by the holder, fairly
insures that there will be no subsequent transfer, for few
debtors would choose to risk the imposition of contempt proceed-
ings against them. 13 In contrast, no seizure of the certificate
or other measure calculated to prevent its further transfer
is required as a condition precedent to levy in Missouri. Thus
some unsuspecting vendee may purchase the debtor's certificate
only to discover that the shares it represents were sold on execu-
tion two years before! The conclusion that no impounding of
the certificate is necessary for an effective execution sale is
inescapable in view of the express retention of sections 513.115
and 513.120 as methods of attachment and levy. Moreover,
however inconsistent the result may be with the purpose of
the Uniform Act, which endeavors to give the stock certificate
the characteristics of a negotiable instrument, the purchaser
at the execution sale must prevail over the innocent holder for
12. That seizure under the Uniform Act means continued possession by
the levying officer and not a mere momentary manucaption with subsequent
relinquishment of possession to the holder see Mulock v. Ulizio, 102 N.J.L.
251, 131 Atl. 622 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
13. As a practical matter, whenever the court has the in personam
jurisdiction necessary for the injunction it will also direct the surrender
of the certificate as authorized by section 14.
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value. Otherwise it would be impossible to realize on the
attached property since there would always be a possibility of a
subsequent transfer of the original certificate.
THE "SITUS" OF THE SHARE
Although there has as yet been no appellate interpretation of
section 13 by the Missouri courts in a situation involving the
rival claims of an innocent holder for value and an attaching
creditor, section 13 was challenged by the debtor-owner of
attached shares in State ex rel. North Ameican Co. v. Koerner.14
The plaintiff brought an in rem libel action against the defendant
company which owned stock in the Union Electric Co. of Mis-
souri. The share certificates were held in New York by the non-
resident defendant, so the plaintiff employed the remedies of
sections 513.115 and 513.120. The defendant argued that the
Missouri courts were without jurisdiction to hear the case.
Its principal contention was that section 13 of the Missouri
Act was so utterly inconsistent with and repugnant to the rest
of the act that it could not stand with it, and that the effect
of the other portions of the act was to embody the share in the
certificate which was not within the jurisdiction, and that hence
there was nothing upon which to base an in rem jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, while acknowledging that Mis-
souri's version of section 13 was out of harmony with the re-
niainder of the act, nevertheless sustained it. The Court said:
... the intent of Section 13 is so clear that it must be held
that attachment proceedings under the prior statutes were
intended to constitute an additional method to those set out
in Section 1 whereby shares of stock might be transferred.
. . . There are some cases where stock certificates under
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act have been held negotiable
instruments .... However, a stock certificate has for many
years been recognized as a different type of instrument.
It is the tangible evidence of title to a unique type of in-
tangible property having a situs at the domicile of the cor-
poration. The legislature by passing the Transfer Act has
made a stock certificate more freely transferable without
changing the nature of the property right of the stockholder
and without changing the situs of the property. This it
14, 357 Mo. 908, 211 S.W.2d 698 (1948), appeal dismissed 835 U.S. 803
(1948), rehearing denied 335 U.S. 864 (1948).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/5
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had the right to do. The stock certificate remains a title
document, not the property itself."
The Court then concluded: "Section 13 although clearly out of
harmony with the evident intent of the framers of the model
act is not so contradictory as to destroy the remainder of the
Transfer Act as adopted by our legislature."' 16
Prior to the UNIFORM STOCK TRANSF ACT it was generally
agreed that the "situs" of corporate shares was with the cor-
poration in its domiciliary state. 7 The consensus in cases
where the Uniform Act has been adopted intact is that, at least
for the purposes of attachment and levy, the "situs" of the
corporate share is now with the certificate wherever it may be
found. 8 These cases now generally use the broad terminology
that "the share has been embodied in the certificate." Cer-
tainly this was the intent of the framers of the Model Act."
A few cases involving the Uniform Act as originally recom-
mended have held that the "situs" of the share remains un-
changed despite section 13 of the Uniform Act and other sections
which indicate a new location of the share. 0 Those cases which
15. Id. at 919, 211 S.W.2d at 702.
16. Id. at 921, 211 S.W.2d at 704.
17. Jellenick v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1 (1900) ; Thompson
v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 89 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1937); Richardson v.
Busch, 198 Mo. 174, 95 S.W. 894 (1906); 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COR-
PORATiONS 94 (1931).
18. Montfort v. Korte, 100 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1938); Blake v. Foreman
Bros. & Co., 218 Fed. 264 (N.D. Ill. 1914); Newell v. Tremont Lumber Co.,
161 La. 649, 189 So. 344 (1920); Haughey v. Haughey, 305 Mich. 356 9
N.W.2d 575 (1943); Elgart v. Mintz, 123 N.J. Eq. 404, 197 At. 747 (6h.
1938); Johnson v. Wood, 15 N.J. Misc. 150, 189 Atl. 613 (Cir. Ct. 1936);
Lockwood v. U.S. Steel Corp., 209 N.Y. 315, 103 N.E. 697 (1915); Iron
City Say. Bank v. Isaacson, 158 Va. 609, 164 S.E. 520 (1932); Snyder
Motor Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 199 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
This difference between the shares in a corporation from a jurisdiction
in which the Uniform Act has been adopted and one in which it has not
is strikingly illustrated in Mill v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939).
In that case the plaintiff sought to levy upon shares of his judgment
debtor which had been pledged to a bank in Pennsylvania. Three of the
shares were those of a Virginia corporation, a jurisdiction which had
adopted the Uniform Act, and one was of a Delaware corporation, ajurisdiction which had not. It was held that the seizure of the shares
in Pennsylvania was an effective levy upon the shares in the Virginia
corporation, but not upon those of the Delaware corporation.
19. See Commissioners' Notes, 6 UNIFoRrI LAws ANNOTATED 2, 10
(1922).
20. McQuillen v. Nat. Cash Register Co., 13 F. Supp. 53 (D. Md. 1935);
Harvey v. Harvey, 290 Fed. 653 (7th Cir. 1923); Warren v. New Jersey
Zinc Co., 116 N.J. Eq. 315, 173 At. 128 (Ch. 1934). Cf. Harris v. Chicago
Title and Trust Co., 338 Ill. 245, 170 N.E. 285 (1930).
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hold that the "situs" remains in the corporation even for
purposes of attachment and levy would appear to be erroneous
in view of the language of section 13 of the Uniform Act, and
they have been adversely criticized.21
Nevertheless, in view of the content of Missouri's section 13
the decision in the North American case can hardly be said
to be erroneous. Although some of the comprehensive dicta
of the case might be questioned, the result itself was inevitable
unless the court chose to run the risk of being accused of
"judicial legislation." The court had no choice but to hold that
the "situs" of the share remained in Missouri under the facts of
the case. As was pointed out, the act as adopted in Missouri
purports to be nothing more than a provision regulating the
transfer of shares.2 2 At first blush it might appear that the
other portions of the Uniform Act, as was argued by the de-
fendant in the North Amerian case, so effectively identify the
share with the certificate that it could not be considered to have
a "situs" apart from the certificate. However, it has been pointed
out that the term "situs" is rather misleading and in reality
there can be no true "situs" of a corporate share in the same
sense as when that term is applied to a piece of tangible prop-
erty." Perhaps the best justification of the court's decision
is the thought "embodied" in the following quotation by a
learned writer on the subject:
That the stock certificate has been endowed with the same
degree of negotiability as commercial paper does not mean
that the share has been made identical with the certificate.
Power to transfer title to the obligation by doing specific
acts has been given to the holder of the paper-a power not
given to the casual possessor of tangible chattels, except
coin. By endorsing and delivering the certificate, he trans-
fers the intangible rights which it evidences.... The other
characteristics of stock, the rights and obligations which it
21. Hine, Situs of Shares of Stock under the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, 87 U. OF PA. L. Riv. 700, 706 (1939).
22. State ex rel. North American Co. v. Koerner, 357 Mo. 908, 909, 211
S.W.2d 698, 702 (1948).
23. "There can be no actual 'situs' of a share of stock. If 'situs' is to be
used in the sense of physical location it might better be abandoned entirely.
What Professor Powell has said of the debt is equally applicable to
the corporate share. 'It isn't that kind of an animal. Any talk about
its location is necessarily a medley of metaphor and analogy.' . . . 'Situs'
would seem to be pretty much what the courts make it." Pomerance,
The Situs of Stock, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 43, 47 (1931).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/5
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involves, still constitute, however, the intangible relation-
ship of which the certificate is only a representation. Even
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act does not make the certi-
ficate the obligation. Stock still is intangible, hence it re-
mains impossible, even under the Act, to give the share
a physical location.24
Thus it is clear that although under the Uniform Act, the share
is for convenience and correctly so, spoken of as embodied in
the share, this is but a metaphor for the intangible right may
be located wherever it is convenient to do so. That the "situs"
of shares may be varied by courts and legislatures as the
dictates of policy demand is illustrated by the fact that although
the share may be considered as located elsewhere for the pur-
pose of levy and attachment, the Supreme Court has held that
the proper place for the imposition of an inheritance tax is the
domicile of the owner.25 Thus the Supreme Court of Missouri
was justified in holding that the legislature might confer certain
elements of negotiability upon the certificate while retaining
jurisdiction in the courts of Missouri for purpose of attachment
and levy.
Although attachment by means of seizure of the certificate
is sanctioned in Missouri, it is questionable whether in rem
jurisdiction could be obtained by that means outside of Missouri.
The general rules governing the power of a jurisdiction other
than the corporate domicile to permit levy and attachment of
the corporate share were laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Direktion der Disconto-Gesellsehaft v. United States Steel
Corporation.26 The holding of that opinion is summarized in the
Restatement, Conflict of Laws:
(1) Shares in a corporation are subject to the jurisdiction
of the state in which the corporation was incorporated.
(2) The share certificate is subject to the jurisdiction of
the state in whose territory it is.
(3) To the extent to which the law of the state in which
the corporation was incorporated embodies the share in
the certificate the share is subject to the jurisdiction
of the state which has jurisdiction of the certificate.27
Thus because the UNIFORM STOCK ThANSFER ACT when adopted
in its entirety is regarded as embodying the share in the certi-
24. Id. at 49.
25. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1931).
26. 267 U.S. 22 (1924).
27. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1934).
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ficate, it is held that the shares may then be attached by seizure
outside the state of incorporation. 8  However, in view of the
fact that this power is one which may be withheld by the state
of incorporation, ' the opposite result might be reached in the
case of shares of a Missouri corporation. The North American
case makes clear that, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, the legislature has chosen to retain the corporation
as the "situs" of the share for attachment purposes and that the
share is not embodied in the certificate. These sweeping state-
ments by the Supreme Court were necessarily dicta it is true,
and as they were not necessary to the decision in the case might
better have been omitted, but nevertheless, they serve notice
that in the opinion of the Missouri court the share is under no
circumstances embodied in the certificate. Thus since we must
look to the law of the state of incorporation to determine whether
the share can be attached outside of that state, foreign jurisdic-
tions faced with the problem might feel that such attachment is
not possible, that the share is not embodied in the certificate
under any circumstances. If the dictum of the Missouri court be
taken as the law on the subject, under the Restatement rule only
Missouri has jurisdiction in rem of the shares.
Despite the language of the Missouri court the above result is
not a certainty, however; for although the court says the certif-
icate is not an embodiment of the share, the fact remains that
the legislature has seen fit to treat the seizure of the certificate
of a Missouri corporation (in Missouri at least) a sufficient
act on which to predicate an attachment proceeding and thus
it might be interpreted as saying that in the event the method
of seizure is chosen the "situs" of the share will be considered
as within the certificate. As pointed out, the "situs" of a given
share need not always be the same place- "'Situs' is a term
applied to a number of juristic results."' 0 Thus if the dictum
of the North American case is ignored, the actual holding of the
case would not be inconsistent with finding the share sufficiently
identified with the certificate to permit an in rem jurisdiction
28. Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939). Cf. Haughey v.
Haughey, 305 Mich. 356, 9 N.W.2d 575 (1943).
29. Wood, Reaching Shares of Stock, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 218, 225 (1932);
Note, 30 HARv. L. REv. 485, 487 (1926).
30. Pomerance, sapra note 22 at 70.
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outside of Missouri based upon a seizure of the certificate.
Nevertheless, so far as those courts devoted to a lump concept
"situs" are concerned, this latter result seems unlikely.
THE WISDOM OF THE MISSOURI RULE OF ATTACHMENT AND LEVY
It is worthy of note that section 13 of the Model Act has more
frequently been the subject of alteration by legislatures adopting
the Uniform Act than any other provision contained therein,81
a fact which indicates a deep-seated concern on the part of the
legislators for the attaching creditor. Although the debates
of the Missouri legislature are not available,32 apparently the
members felt that the Model Act insufficiently protected the
interests of the creditor. Admittedly, there is a balancing of the
31. California omitted Section 13 altogether. The only means of levy
or attachment provided is by notice to the corporation. DEERiNG's CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 541 (1949). "California failed to enact that provision
of the uniform act. In this state the location of the certificate is of no
consequence.... it is not necessary for the sheriff to take physical posses-
sion of the certificates in order to hold a valid sale on execution of the shares.
The sheriff simply gives the purchaser at such sale a certificate of sale
which conveys all the right the debtor had." Partch v. Adams, 55 Cal.
App.2d 1, 5, 130 P.2d 244, 247 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1942). See Comment,
28 CAL. L. REv. 470 (1940). Colorado likewise omitted Section 13. Here,
however, pre-existing attachment statutes were repealed so that the only
method by which a creditor can reach shares in Colorado appears to be by
the means provided in Section 14 of the Uniform Act. See editor's note
to COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 41 § 99 (1935). Florida's Section 13, like Missouri's
expressly leaves in force the previously existing method of attachment by
notice to the corporation. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 688.15, 55.26, 55.30 (1941).
The same result is provided for in Kansas. LAWS, KANSAS C. 17, Art. 3218
(1949). Section 13 is wholly omittid in Massachusetts. Central Mortgage
Co. v. Buff, 278 Mass. 233, 179 N.E. 628 (1932). Section 13 of the Montana
Act permits attachment and levy by notice to the corporation in addition
to the methods sanctioned by the Uniform Act. MONT. REV. CODE tit.
15-640 (1947). Vermont permits an attachment by notice to the corpora-
tion, but provides that the attachment shall have no effect upon the rights
of an innocent holder for value of the certificate. VT. LAWS § 5818 (1947).
32. The Senate and House Journals do reveal the following legislative
history of the Uniform Act. The Act was introduced into the Missouri
House precisely as set forth in the Model Act. JOURNAL MO. HOUSE REP.,
62nd Gen. Ass. 595 (1943). The only substantial change wrought in the
House was the striking of the words "and To Make Uniform the Law with
Relation Thereto" from the title of the Act. Id. at 881. Thus with Section
13 intact the Act passed the House 100-11. Id. at 1139. In the Senate,
the Senate Committee on Private Corporations recommended the amendment
of Section 13 to read as it does now. JOURNAL MO. SEN., 62nd Gen. Ass.
1394 (1943). The Committee's recommendation was adopted by an un-
specified vote, but then the entire Act as amended was defeated 17-13. Id.
at 1661. The next day the vote of rejection was reconsidered, and the
amended bill passed the Senate 19-10. Id. at 1686. The Senate amendment
and the amended Act subsequently passed in the House by a vote of
105-34. JOURNAL Mo. HOUSE REP., 62nd Gen. Ass. 2034 (1943).
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interests of the creditor and the innocent purchaser to be made,
but the legislature appears to have unduly weighted the scales
in favor of the former. In enacting section 13 in its present
form, the legislature has largely defeated the aim and purpose
of the rest of the Act. The other provisions of the Act are
designed to make stock certificates approximate negotiable in-
struments as nearly as possible-to enhance their transferability
and hence marketability by rendering unnecessary an investiga-
tion of the vendor's title and the like by the prospective pur-
chaser. Section 5, 3 for example, provides that the delivery of a
properly indorsed certificate shall pass good title to an innocent
purchaser even though the transfer is made by one having
no right to possession nor authority from the owner of the
certificate to make the transfer. Section 15 34 provides that the
corporation shall have no lien on the share nor may it impose a
restriction upon its transfer unless the existence of these is
noted upon the certificate. Thus the Act is designed to foster
the same confidence in stock certificates that was long ago
achieved by the negotiable instruments law in the field of com-
mercial paper. But Missouri's section 13 largely sets at naught
the benficial effects of the other sections, for although the pur-
chaser no longer need concern himself about the possibility of a
corporate lien, unauthorized transfer and the like, he will still
be hesitant about taking the certificate at face value because of
the possibility of a previous execution having taken place. To
be sure the field of investigation of the prospective purchaser
is reduced to one place, the office of the corporation, but such an
investigation would probably take several days thus imposing
an intolerable handicap upon commercial intercourse. Thus it is
clear that there are very strong considerations supporting the
requirement of the Model Act that the certificate be taken
out of circulation before attachment or levy is permitted.
It is true that on the other side of the ledger the interest of
the stockholder's creditor are to be given considerable weight
also. Concededly, the concealment of such small objects as stock
certificates is easily achieved, and the conventional method of
levying upon tangible property whereby the levying officer goes
forth armed with the writ in search of the property is unsuited
33. Mo. REv. STAT. § 403.050 (1949).
34. 3o. REV. STAP § 403.190 (1949).
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to the seizure of stock certificates. However, the drafters of the
Uniform Act recognized this need for an effective method of
enforcing the creditor's rights, and provided that enjoining the
transfer of the certificate would be sufficient. In addition, to
emphasize the right of the creditor to equitable remedies section
14 of the Uniform Act35 provides:
A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a certificate shall
be entitled to such aid from the courts of appropriate
jurisdiction, by injunction and otherwise, in attaching such
certificate or in satisfying the claim by means thereof as is
allowed at law or in equity, in regard to property which
cannot readily be attached or levied upon by ordinary legal
process.
Thus where the creditor can get service on his debtor, at least
in a state which has adopted the UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT,
the creditor will almost certainly be able to realize on the shares.
The certificate need not be in the custody of the holder nor need
it be in the same state as he. For example, a creditor who
obtained service upon his debtor in Oregon was able to realize
on the latter's shares through the aid of the equitable processes
of the Oregon court, although the certificates lay in the holder's
safe deposit box in the state of Washington."6
It is apparent then, that the creditor is not wholly without
remedy under the Model Uniform Act. It is true that the
remedies of the creditor under the Uniform Act are not so
certain as those existing prior to it, for notice to the corporation
could nearly always be effected with a minimum of difficulty,
whereas the creditor's ability to get effective jurisdiction of
the stockholder and/or the certificate will not always be so clear.
However, the creditors of the holders of negotiable paper have
been without any more effective remedies for quite some time,
and yet this result has not been deemed too great a hardship
35. Mo. REv. STAT. § 403.180 (1949).
36. ". . . it was the intention of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, in drafting the uniform stock transfer
act, and the legislature in enacting it, to give to the word 'holder' as
therein used substantially the same meaning that it has when applied to
negotiable instruments." Hodes v. Hodes, 176 Ore. 102, 108, 155 P.2d 564, 567
(1945). Sections 13 and 14 do not sanction attachment by enjoining the cor-
poration from transferring the shares in its books. Amm v. Amm, 117 N.J.
Eq. 185, 175 Atl. 186 (Ch. 1939); Block-Daneman Co. v. Mandelker, 205
Wis. 641, 238 N.W. 831 (1931). The former case in effect repudiates the
erroneous decision in Warren v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 116 N.J. Eq. 315, 173
Atl. 128 (Ch. 1934).
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upon creditors in view of the desirable results otherwise
achieved. (It is true that commercial paper seldom represents
a long term investment as the stock certificate does, but the case
of negotiable bonds seems analogous to the latter.) In achieving
the free transferability of stock certificates the sacrifice of the
creditor is well worth it. As was pointed out in one case:
•.. it was the purpose of the act to prevent attachment of
stock which might belong to a person not within the juris-
diction of the court in order to increase its negotiability
as well as its marketability. If this results in some apparent
discrimination against the citizens of this state, as owners
of stock in corporations organized in other states having
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, they enjoy an equal bene-
fit.-
The situation in Missouri is particularly to be deprecated, for
the other provisions of the Act involve an element of sacrifice
on the part of stockholders in order to achieve increased market-
ability; they risk loss of their shares by having indorsed certifi-
cates stolen or lost and subsequently transferred to an innocent
holder. Yet despite such sacrifices which are admittedly well
worth the price of free negotiability, that goal is not achieved
because of the posssibility that long ago execution may have
been had upon the shares in the Missouri corporation repre-
sented by the certificate. It would be well worth while for the
legislature to reconsider its alteration of section 13 as set forth
in the Model Act, a provision evolved out of the prolonged study
and consideration of experts in the field.
WARREN R. MAICHEL
37. Block-Daneman Co. v. Mandelker, 205 Wis. 641, 648, 238 N.W. 831,
833 (1931).
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